- Beijing, 17 March 2015 -



- Vivien Terrien -

COMMISSION DECISION "INTEL"

13 May 2009

Commission decision, Intel, 13.5.09

Facts

- Intel: microchip manufacturer
- 13 May 2009: Commission decision
 - Main general facts:
 - €1.06 billion fine on Intel
 - HIGHEST FINE EVER IMPOSED BY COMMISSION ON A SINGLE COMPANY
 - abused its dominant position
 - on the worldwide market for x86 central processing units (CPU)
 - strategy aimed at foreclosing the only serious competitor, AMD
 - immediate order to bring an end to the infringement

Commission decision, Intel, 13.5.09

Main elements on dominance (1/2)

1/. Market shares

Intel found to hold a market share of ≈ 70% or more

2/. Barriers to entry

Extremely difficult for competitors to enter the market and to expand

- \rightarrow unrecoverable investments to be made in R&D, IP and production facilities
- Intel → operating margins // Microsoft's in COM decision (≈ 81%)
 - Level of profitability \rightarrow confirmation of substantial market power
 - ≠ Dell (9%) and HP (4%)

UNAVOIDABLE SUPPLIER of x86 CPUs

- customers \rightarrow no choice other than to obtain part of their requirements from Intel
- strong brand status (must-stock)

Commission decision, Intel, 13.5.09

Main elements on dominance (2/2)

3/. Evidence of actual competition

Evidence of falling prices \rightarrow not inconsistent with dominance

- Microprocessor industry is characterized by rapid technological progress
- Falling prices are an intrinsic characteristic of this industry

All Intel's competitors, except AMD,

- Have exited the market; or
- Are left with insignificant market share

Commission decision, Intel, 13.5.09

Main elements on abuse (1/3)

realized through several measures adopted by Intel
 vis-à-vis its own customers

- Dell, Lenovo, HP, Acer, NEC
- vis-à-vis the European retailer of microelectronic devices
 - Media-Saturn-Holding

Commission decision, Intel, 13.5.09

Main elements on abuse (2/3)

- 1/. rebates to four major manufacturers (Dell, Lenovo, HP, NEC)condition: purchase from Intel all or almost all their x86 CPUs
- 2/. reward payments to Media-Saturn
- condition: exclusive sales of computer containing Intel chips
- 3/. payments to three computer manufacturers (HP, Acer, Lenovo)
- condition: postpone or cancel the launch of AMD CPU-based products, and/or
 condition: put restrictions on the distribution of AMD CPU-based products

Commission decision, Intel, 13.5.09

Main elements on abuse (3/3)

Rebates and payments \rightarrow loyalty

- \rightarrow significant diminution of competitors' ability to compete on merits
- \rightarrow reduction of consumer choice
- \rightarrow lower incentives to innovate

CASE T-286/09

INTEL CORP. V. COMMISSION

12 June 2014

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

Procedure

- 22 July 2009: Action for annulment before the EU General Court
- 12 June 2014: EU General Court judgment
 - \rightarrow Intel's action is dismissed in its entirety
- 28 August 2014: Appeal to the EU Court of Justice
 - Case C-413/14 P, pending

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

1 MAIN FINDINGS RE THE ABUSE

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

Need to prove actual foreclosure effect?

NO

Need to prove **potential** foreclosure effect?

NO

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

Need to prove **casual link** between any effect and the rebates?

NO

Can competitors' growth demonstrate absence of abuse?

NO

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

Should the **AEC test** be applied to show foreclosure?

NO

Need to proceed to a **case-by-case analysis** taking into account all the circumstances of the case?

NO

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

→ Per se abuse?

By their very nature, they are capable of restricting competition and foreclosing competitors

Incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition with the common market

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

3 categories of rebates (1/5)

Quantity rebates

- solely linked to volume of purchases from dominant company
- generally considered not to have the foreclosure effect
- if quantity supplied increases \rightarrow lower costs for the supplier
 - supplier is entitled to pass on that reduction to the customer
 - in the form of a more favorable tariff
- reflect gains in efficiency and economies of scale

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

3 categories of rebates (2/5)

Exclusivity rebates (1/3)

- conditional on the customer's obtaining all or most of its requirements from the undertaking in a dominant position
- close to per se abuse
 - not based on an economic transaction which justifies this burden or benefit
 - designed to remove/restrict purchaser's freedom to choose his sources of supply
 - designed to deny other producers access to the market
 - save in exceptional circumstances

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

3 categories of rebates (3/5)

Exclusivity rebates (2/3)

- foreclosure effect occurs not only where access is impossible for competitors but also where that access is made more difficult
- thus, no need to demonstrate capacity to restrict competition depending on the circumstances of the case

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

3 categories of rebates (4/5)

Exclusivity rebates (3/3)

- Moreover, in *Intel*, dominant company = unavoidable trading partner
 - customers \rightarrow part of their requirements from Intel (non-contestable share)
 - competitor \rightarrow not in a position to compete for the full supply (contestable share)
 - exclusivity rebates + unavoidable partner \rightarrow more difficult to supply
 - i.e. failing to comply with the exclusivity condition
 - → risks losing not only the rebates for the units that it switched to that competitor, but the entire exclusivity rebate
 - to submit an attractive offer → need to offer attractive conditions for the units that that competitor can itself supply to the customer; BUT ALSO offer compensation for the loss of the exclusivity rebate
 - Thus, exclusivity rebates enables dominant company to use its economic power on the non-contestable share as leverage to secure also the contestable share

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #1: Exclusivity rebates

3 categories of rebates (5/5)

Other rebates

- financial incentive not directly linked to (quasi)exclusive supply
- rebate may have a fidelity-building effect
- e.g., attainment of individual sales objectives
 - do not contain any obligation to obtain all or a given proportion of supplies
- necessary to consider all the circumstances

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

JUSTIFICATIONS?

Principles re justification analysis (1/2)

The conduct is **objectively necessary**

Case 311/84, *CBEM*, 3.10.85, para. 27

Exclusionary effect is counterbalanced/outweighed

- by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers
 - Case C-95/04 P, British Airways/Commission, 15.3.07, para. 86

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

JUSTIFICATIONS?

Just a reminder!

Principles re justification analysis (2/2)

- Thus, dominant company has to show that:
 - the efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct counteract any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets
 - those gains have been, or are likely to be, brought about as a result of that conduct
 - such conduct is **necessary** for the achievement of those gains in efficiency
 - it does not eliminate effective competition by removing all or most existing sources of actual or potential competition

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

JUSTIFICATIONS? (1/3)

Small market shares on markets targeted by rebates?

NO

Clients can still get products from competitors on other segments?

NO

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JUSTIFICATIONS? (2/3)

In case exclusivity not respected no sanction (reduction or cancelation) really applied?

NO

Existence of a threat is enough

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

JUSTIFICATIONS? (3/3)

Objectively necessary or potential foreclosure effect counterbalanced by efficiency for consumers?

Possible

Intel did not put forward any argument in that regard

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

EVEN IF

EFFECT-BASED APPROACH

- AEC test
 - concerns only impossible access
- If test result = negative
 - competitor cannot cover its costs to get the contestable share
- If test result = positive
 - competitor can cover its costs to get the contestable share
 - HOWEVER doesn't mean that eviction effect doesn't exist
 - access is still more difficult, even if economically-speaking "possible"

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #2: Reward payments (Naked restrictions)

- Conditions to get the payments
 - sales orientation of competitor's products
 - obligation to forbid distributors to stock competitor's products
 - launch postponement/cancellation of competitor's products
- Result of these three conditions
 - more difficult market access for competitors
- Willingness behind these conditions
 - targeted to one specific competitor
 - to cause harm \rightarrow anticompetitive object
 - \neq competition on the merits (at least, not clear)

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #2: Reward payments

Effect-based approach (1/3)

What about the proof of qualified/concrete effects?

Only alternative approach

Commission cannot be passive towards threat on effective competition structure of the common market

Even though the threat has not or has not yet produce any effects

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14 ABUSE #2: Reward payments

Effect-based approach (2/3)

What about immediate, substantial and foreseeable effects?

"unique and continuous infringement" no need to look at isolated behaviors

sufficient to look at it globally

→ enough if **susceptible** to have substantial effects

Otherwise

individually taken \rightarrow none of these behavior with substantial effects **BUT** same aim pursued \rightarrow all together = substantial effects

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

ABUSE #2: Reward payments

Effect-based approach (3/3)

What about implementation of these measures?

Implementation by client ≠ Intel

 \rightarrow artificial approach

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

Value of third party's declaration

Can abuse be proven based on 3rd party declaration?

YES

No interest to incriminate the dominant company ✓ Cartel (article 101 TFEU) → participants' declarations


Should be sufficient in itself to demonstrate the infringements

Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission, 12.6.14

#2

MAIN FINDINGS RE PROCEDURE

Ulrich von Koppenfels



- Pending -

Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v. Commission, pending A

Main grounds of appeal

ARPLICATION OF THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD

→ Should have been effect-based approach

- Cannot conclude → conduct was inherently capable of restricting competition
 - without considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding it
- Cannot establish an abuse in assessing capability to restrict competition
 - on the basis of abstract considerations rather than likely or actual effects
 - Wrong alternative finding (= conduct was capable of restricting competition)
 - factors taken into account cannot establish that capability; and
 - relevant factors were not considered, such as
 - the market coverage of the practice, the duration of the alleged practices,
 - actual market evidence of rapidly declining prices and a lack of foreclosure; and
 - the conclusions to be properly drawn from the as-efficient competitor (AEC) test

Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v. Commission, pending 🥂

Main grounds of appeal

NO INFRINGEMENT FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS

→ Small part of the relevant market affected

- the final 2 years of the alleged period of infringement
- the market coverage of the conduct would have affected, at most, a mere 3.5 % of the relevant market

Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v. Commission, pending A

Main grounds of appeal

WRONG QUALIFICATION OF THE CONDUCT

→ Cannot be qualified as 'exclusivity rebates'

conduct affects small part of competitors' customers' requirements

- only 28 % (HP) and < 42 % (Lenovo) of each customer's total purchases</p>
- \neq 'all or most' of these customers' requirements

Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v. Commission, pending

Main grounds of appeal

VIOLATION OF

EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION & PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES

 \rightarrow Meeting with Dell executive

- Not sufficient to disclose a mere list of topics discussed
 - obligation to provide a record or summary of what was said
- Wrong appraisal of burden of proof
 - only to show \rightarrow not excluded that material could be used for defense
 - not to adduce prima facie evidence that Commission failed to record exculpatory evidence

Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v. Commission, pending

Main grounds of appeal

WRONG APPRAISAL OF EU JURISDICTION

No jurisdiction over certain Intel's agreements with Lenovo


- not 'implemented' in the EEA
 - b/c Intel did not sell any products to Lenovo in the EEA under these agreements
- 'qualified effects' test is not an appropriate basis
 - b/c not foreseeable that these agreements for delivery in China
 - would have an immediate and substantial effect within the EEA

Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v. Commission, pending 🥂

Main grounds of appeal

WRONG CALCULATION OF THE FINE

- Manifestly disproportionate
- Violation of fundamental principles of EU law
 - cannot apply Commission's 2006 fining guidelines
 - to conduct that had pre-dated them



Ulrich von Koppenfels