

#### Session IV

# DG COMP's practice in case cooperation with foreign enforcement authorities

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Disclaimer: This presentation reflects my personal views and should not be reported as representing the official views of the European Commission.




## Why international cooperation?

☐ Economic Globalisation (relevant markets increasingly becoming global) Legitimacy of competition enforcement: ☐ Create a level playing field with fair competition on equal terms across the globe Well-functioning markets fundamental to reap the full benefits of free international trade ■ A world of multiple enforcers Increase interoperability of rules and enforcement to: Maintain and protect enforcement effectiveness Avoid diverging / conflicting outcomes Increase predictability, legal certainty and transparency to reduce firms' policy risk and administrative burden Instruments: Policy, technical, enforcement cooperation



#### Why international cooperation?

#### Global expansion of competition regimes





# The EU experience

- The European Competition Network (ECN)
- Bilateral relations outside the EU:
  - Intensify cooperation with trusted Competition Authorities of main trading partners (dedicated agreements)
  - Build up relations with new BRICS Competition Authorities (MoUs on cooperation)
  - Promote alignment in EU Neighbourhood
- Engagement in multilateral fora (ICN, OECD, UNCTAD, WTO)



## Trend: Multilateralism in cooperation

#### Cartels:


- Increased multilateralism. In 2010-2011: average of 4 agencies involved in each cooperation enforcement case
- Examples: <u>The Refrigeration Compressors Cartel</u> (8 non-EU-agencies) and the <u>Airfreight Cartel</u> (7 non-EU-agencies), <u>Marine Hoses Cartel</u> (US + Japan)

#### Mergers:


- Multiple notifications required in most transnational mergers. Agencies tend to increasingly co-operate.
- Ex.: Thermo Fischer / Life Technologies (7 non-EU-agencies)



#### EU cases of international cooperation:



#### ALL CASES:





# Areas of cooperation:

Dawn raids/Inspections (18% cartel)

Obtaining waivers (>70% merger)

Characteristics of relevant market (>80% merger and 58% antitrust)

Theories of harm (>50% in antitrust and merger)

Timing of proceedings and decision (>80% in cartel and merger; 58% antitrust)

Avoidance of conflicting decisions (>50% merger)

Remedies (>50% merger)



# Information exchange



#### Information exchange - conceptual issues (1)

#### Five broad categories of information:

- Public available information
- 2. Non-public agency information
- Non-confidential, case-related information
- 4. Confidential information
  - Leniency applicant information cannot generally be shared, and certainly not without a waiver
  - Exceptions exist, (i) confidentiality waivers, (ii)
    national legislations (so-called information
    gateway), (iii) regional cooperation networks and
    (iv) bilateral agreements
- 5. Decisions after publication





#### Information exchange - conceptual issues (2)

- When?
  - Investigation still covert
  - Investigation is publicly known
- What?
  - Basic rule: Exchange only non-confidential information
  - Exception: exchange of confidential information
    - Confidentiality Waivers, ECN, 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Agreements
    - Balancing act: Ease information exchange / respecting protection of confidential information/ rights of defence
- How?
  - Establish trusted contact(person)
  - Contact at what level?
  - Primarily telephone calls
  - No exchange of actual documents needed





#### Information exchange - conceptual issues (3)

How to establish a cooperative relationship with other competition authorities?

- Information exchange must be built on mutual trust and respect
- Enforcement record
- Is reciprocity required?

#### Procedural Legal Safeguards

- Definition of confidential information/business secrets (narrow vs broad scope)
- Rules for collecting/seizing information (incl. Legal Professional Privilege)
- Use of shared information (intelligence and/or as evidence)?
- No self-incrimination
- Civil vs criminal law



## EU's legal basis for sharing information

#### Basic procedural Regulation (1/2003)

- Article 11: Cooperation DG Comp + Member States
- Article 12: European Competition Network (ECN)
- Article 15: Member States National Courts
- Article 27: Parties' access to the file
- Article 28: Protection of professional secrecy
- Procedural Regulation (773/2004) Chapter VI

#### Bilateral agreements

- First generation (US, Japan, Korea, Canada)
- Second generation (Switzerland, (Canada))





# Confidentiality waivers



# Securing waivers from leniency applicants to facilitate discussions between authorities

- EU: Voluntary if company gives waivers
- Commission asks for confidentiality waivers:
  - when immunity is applied for
  - when markers are applied for
- EU respects field of use limitations in waivers
- Waivers are therefore not the answer to everything:
  - Terms may differ between jurisdictions
  - Different immunity and cooperating parties



## Waiver wording (1)

- [Name of the applicant] agrees to a waiver of the confidentiality rules of [Agency A] to [orally] discuss the submission made by [name of the applicant] to [Agency A] with [Agency B] regarding its investigation of [number of file/short description of market/industry].
- [For AGENCIES WHERE EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS IS PROHIBITED For the avoidance of doubt, this waiver excludes the transmission by [Agency A] of any hard copy or electronic version of documents or submissions made by [name of applicant] including any quotations or extracts of them].



# Waiver wording (2)

- [Agency A] shall make [Agency B] fully aware of the confidentiality of the information disclosed by virtue of this waiver. [Agency A] shall treat information received from [Agency B] in accordance with its own applicable confidentiality rules.
- The present waiver does not alter [Agency A] obligation to protect the confidentiality of information submitted by the applicant with respect to parties other than [Agency B] in accordance with the applicable legislation.



# Information sharing: Conclusions (1)

- To be of real use in a "live" investigation, the shared information must be pertinent and timely. Potential risk that complicated procedures make information sharing cumbersome and slow.
- Strict safeguards must be put in place to allow safe transfer of case-related evidence between agencies.
- Avoid negative "spill-over effects": If firms perceive a risk of confidential information being shared inappropriately with other jurisdictions, firms will be less forthcoming when providing information.
- "Incidents" will seriously undermine the credibility of an enforcer (in particular when it comes to leniency).



# Information sharing: Conclusions (2)

You can discuss and achieve a lot without exchanging confidential information, e.g. market functioning and definitions, theory of harm, remedy design, avoid diverging outcomes.

#### Challenges:

- How to simplify and streamline cooperation procedures while providing adequate procedural safeguards?
- How to ensure to that the right information is shared at the right moment (despite heterogeneous legal frameworks and procedures)?
- How to safeguard the protection of confidential information, business secrets and personal data?



# Coordination of investigations (incl. dawn raids)



# Coordination of investigations

Is there a case for coordination?

- Prioritization of investigations
- Investigative tools to be used?
- Compatibility of enforcement regimes
- Centre of gravity of infringement

Benefits of coordination - increased impact Factors:

- Time zones
- Particular developments in cartel
- Forensic IT + sealing of premises
- Access to evidence/witnesses



# Discussions about analysis of the case?

- Market functioning
- Relevant market
- Theory of harm
- Remedies
- Timing of decision making



# Better cooperation: Tips and issues

- Building trust between enforcers' staff
- Start contacts between enforcers early
- Timing of procedures: juggle role of the parties and flexibility by enforcers
- Strive for simultaneous leniency/immunity application
- Parties granting of confidentiality waivers: enforcers must guarantee protection of business secrets
- Level of convergence and transparency in the investigative procedures & substantive assessment



#### **Further information**

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